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Altruism refers to an other-benefiting behavior that is costly but bears no direct profit to
oneself. At least three different forms can be distinguished: help giving, altruistic punish-
ment, and moral courage. We investigated the differential impact of two thinking modes,
intuitive (System 1) and rational (System 2), on these three altruistic behaviors. Situational
(state-related) thinking style was manipulated via experimental instructions and generally
preferred thinking style (trait-related) was assessed via questionnaires.We found that of the
subjectively preferred thinking styles (trait), faith in intuition (System 1) promoted sharing
and altruistic punishment, whereas need for cognition (System 2) promoted volunteering
in a situation that required moral courage. By contrast, we did not find a significant effect
of situational thinking style (state) on any of the altruistic behaviors, although manipula-
tion checks were positive. Results elucidate the affective-motivational underpinnings of
different types of altruistic behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION
Altruism is a form of prosocial motivation that benefits others but
is costly to oneself. This can mean that the benefit to others is
greater than the benefits to oneself, or in strictest terms that there
are no benefits to oneself. In terms of overt behavior, altruism can
take at least three forms: costly sharing, altruistic punishment, and
moral courage. These three have been investigated rather inde-
pendently in the past; hence it is not clear whether they originate
from the same motivation. The first form of altruism is costly shar-
ing and it refers to help giving, when one party gives from their
resources to another without receiving anything in return. Abun-
dant research has shown that the most often mentioned motivator
this form of altruism is empathy (e.g., Batson, 1991), and it is
thought to be supported by and serves to maintain positive affect
(Stel et al., 2008).
Secondly, human altruism can take the form of costly puni-
tive actions against norm violators with the aim of enforcing
social norms, which is referred to as altruistic punishment. This
behavior has been suggested to be crucial to encouraging and
maintaining social cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), and to
increase equality among group members (Fowler et al., 2005). The
emotive-motivational basis includes feelings of anger aroused by
the observed unfairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Fehr and
Gächter, 2002; Singer and Steinbeis, 2009), and feelings of satisfac-
tion when norm violators are punished (de Quervain et al., 2004;
Strobel et al., 2011). While clearly altruistic punishment is costly
to oneself, the benefit to others may not be as straight forward;
altruistic punishment maintains fairness and cooperation among
humans, and can thus be seen as a social investment benefiting
societal groups at large, especially under anonymous conditions.
In anonymous situations, the benefit to oneself in form of repu-
tation building is eliminated as is the possibility of retaliation or
social sanctions.
Finally, there is moral courage, which is the willingness to speak
up or take action in a situation that conflicts with one’s moral or
feelings of justice. Justice sensibility, moral mandates, and anger
seem to be among the promoters of moral courage (Kayser et al.,
2010). Previous studies have suggested that anticipated emotions
and self-conscious emotions – such as guilt, shame, and pride –
mediate the willingness to engage in this type of potentially costly
act against injustice (Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007; Sekerka et al.,
2009). In moral courage situations, as in altruistic punishment,
the benefit to others can be more indirect than in help giving and
sharing behavior as the benefiting party may not be a particular
person or group. Instead, the benefit can go to groups of people
or to society at large in the form of establishment of defense of
higher moral values. Many times, however, there will also be a
directly benefiting party such as an individual or a minority of
people whose rights have been violated, for example in a bullying
situation.
From the description of the three forms of altruism it seems
apparent that when people are in certain affective states, their
altruistic behaviors should be stronger than when they are in a
neutral state. This could mean that highly emotional and emotion-
driven individuals, those relying more on their intuition, could be
more prone to act altruistically than people less reliant on their
emotions. Specifically, more empathetic individuals should show
stronger help giving and sharing behavior, and those who tend to
develop feelings of anger should be more inclined to punish and
offensively confront violators of social norms or moral standards
as an instantiation of altruistic punishment and moral courage.
However, the case might be different under non-reciprocal and
anonymous conditions. When no direct social interaction is taking
place, so that the consequences of the altruistic acts are not directly
observable, cognitive control processes may be required to pursue
other-benefiting behavior in accordance with one’s own moral and
fairness standards. This would include the need to inhibit affective
or egoistic impulses in favor of uncertain, delayed, and impersonal
benefits (e.g., for society as a whole). Under those circumstances it
might be that people who like to think things through and consider
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distant and long-term consequences of their actions before mak-
ing a decision might engage more in prosocial behaviors, despite
lower empathy.
The distinction between intuitive and rational modes of pro-
cessing is at the core of dual-processing theories which differen-
tiate, in the most neutral terms, between System 1 and System
2 (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Evans, 2003). Most of the
authors agree that System 1 processes are unconscious, automatic,
and rapid and those of System 2 are conscious, slow, and delib-
erative (for a review, see Evans, 2008). Many different types of
manipulations have been devised to study these processes (e.g.,
Stanovich and West, 1998; Cohen and Andrade, 2004; Horstmann
et al., 2009). For example, it has been established that knowledge
about the rules of a task and asking people to deliberate allows
them to override an intuitive judgment in that task (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1982). However, whether people apply the informa-
tion to override the intuitive processing depends, among others, on
their cognitive skills and on the formulation of the task that make
the rules apparent (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). As of yet there
are no empirical investigations into the question of whether and
how these processing modes affect all of the three types of altruis-
tic behavior described above, and in what way. A recent study has
focused on a connection between situational processing mode and
social cooperation (Rand et al., 2012) by investigating the connec-
tion between reaction times and cooperation in economic games.
Although the study had asked “whether people are predisposed
toward selfishness,” predisposition in the sense of individual apt-
ness was actually not differentiated from situational factors. We
set out to make that differentiation.
The aim of this study is to investigate to which extent
emotional-intuitive (System 1) relative to rational cognitive pro-
cessing (System 2) contributes in anonymous situations to the
three different types of altruistic behavior: help giving, altruistic
punishment, and moral courage. This goal is pursued at two lev-
els within the same study: first, the influence of actual situational
processing mode is investigated by experimental manipulation of
thinking style via instructions; we refer to this as the state processing
mode. Second, the influence of subjectively preferred thinking style
is investigated by means of individual assessment via question-
naire; we refer to this as the trait processing mode. The state-related
processing mode is thought to be more situational and contextu-
ally activated, and hence more related to flexible top-down control
than the latter. The trait-related processing should be habitual and
therefore quite automatic in nature. It could be thought as the
preferred processing style over time that the situational factors
influence and variate. Although at the forefront of current dis-
cussions (Kahneman, 2011), the relationship between the rational
versus intuitive thinking style at those two levels of processing
(state versus trait) and their impact on prosocial behavior has
not to our knowledge been examined before. Results will provide
us with important insights into the mechanisms through which
altruistic behavior is accomplished and can be enhanced.
To approach the important question of altruism under con-
ditions where reciprocity is not possible, we attempted to create
a setting where altruistic acts are performed toward anonymous
others. This makes the research question more challenging as it
bears upon the “true” altruism motice (Harbaugh et al., 2007).
In addition, the anonymity of the situation should degrease any
interpersonal effects, such as the effect of gender, age, likeability,
or other attributes of the other in the monetary games or repu-
tation building, retaliation, or social sanctions or rewards in any
of the measures. In addition, we had participants make decisions
about considerable amounts of money to increase the impact of
their acts and to make the decisions feel as real as possible. To
warrant external validity, we assessed all three forms of altruism
strictly with behavioral tasks. Costly sharing was assessed via dicta-
tor game (DG), where the participant was asked to split an amount
of money between her and an anonymous other (see, e.g., Bolton
et al., 1998), and via donating to charity. Altruistic punishment
was assessed via a series of ultimatum games (UG), where the par-
ticipant decided whether to accept a split an anonymous other
had made, resulting in a varying amount of money for them both,
or to reject the offer in which case neither (the participant nor
the anonymous other) would get anything (see, e.g., Thaler, 1988;
Nowak et al., 2000). Next the participant was asked to volunteer in
a task that requires moral courage. When leaving the laboratory,
the participants were pointed to a charity poster advert and offered
an opportunity to donate. The donation was meant to assess costly
sharing. Previous studies from the embodied cognition approach
and attribution research have shown that keeping such manipu-
lations incidental is vital to their behavioral effects (Schnall et al.,
2008, 2010).
We hypothesize that the pattern of rejecting unfair offers in the
UG will be stronger for participants in which intuitive decision-
making (System 1) is encouraged compared to participants in
which rational cognitive decision-making (System 2) is encour-
aged. Likewise, in the moral courage measure, we anticipate that
participants in the intuition condition will behave more altruis-
tically than in the rational condition. In the two other decisions
(DG and donation), both of which address help giving, we predict
that intuitive processing leads to higher levels of altruism than the
rational mode. The effects of both state and trait processing modes
are hypothesized to be in the same direction.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-eight (N = 29 female) participants, mean age 23.25 years
(SD= 5.85 years), were recruited from lectures of the University
and from the audience of the Night of Science in Frankfurt. Partic-
ipants were students of Medicine (N = 18), Economics (N = 9),
Natural Sciences and/or Mathematics (N = 9), or other disciplines
(N = 12). No students of Psychology were included. The study was
approved by the ethical committee of psychology Johann Wolfgang
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. All the participants gave
their written informed consent before the experiment.
MATERIALS
The short version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-10;
Pacini and Epstein, 1999) was used as the measure of generally
preferred thinking style. The REI-10 includes two independent
subscales: faith in Intuition (FI; e.g., “My initial impressions of
people are almost always right.”) and Need for Cognition (NFC,
e.g.,“I would prefer complex to simple problems.”). The inventory
gives a distribution of the participants’ preferred thinking styles
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and the items were rated on a five-point rating scale (1= completely
false to 5= completely true). The inventory was translated by a
native German speaker and checked by another. The Cronbach’s
alpha reliability was 0.60 for both of the five-item measures of FI
and Need for Cognition. The moderate degree of consistency was
likely due, in part, to the limited number of participants.
The Measure of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein,
1972) was used to acquire a base-line of the participants’ ten-
dency to react with empathy. The questionnaire consists of 33
items (e.g., “Seeing people cry upsets me.”) rated on a nine-point
scale (4= very strong agreement to−4= very strong disagreement ).
The questionnaire was translated by a native German speaker and
checked by another. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability of the 33-item
measure of emotional empathy was 0.70.
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-15; Spinella, 2007) was
used to assess impulsiveness. The 15-items of the scale were
assessed on a four-point scale ranging from Seldom or never to
Nearly always or always. A German version of the scale was used
(Meule et al., 2011). The Cronbach’s alpha reliability of the 15-item
measure of impulsiveness was 0.78.
To measure everyday altruism, a modified altruism question-
naire by Rushton et al. (1981) was used. The scale was translated
by a native German speaker and checked by another. Eight items
from Rushton et al.’s scales were chosen with two new items [“I
have bought someone an ‘immaterial gift’ or donated money to a
charity (e.g., Greenpeace,WWF, Unicef) in their name”and“I have
ignored a person who has asked me the way or to make change
for their money”]. Three items were rated on a seven-point scale
ranging from Never to Daily and the rest on a five-point scale
ranging from Never to Every time. The internal consistency of the
scale was not very high, Cronbach’s α= 0.56.
Social Value Orientation (SVO; Murphy et al., 2011) Slider
Measure assesses how much concern a person has for others.
It consists of six primary and nine secondary items where the
participant indicates by marking on a continuum their resource
allocation choice. The measure gives an angle, which indicates the
participant’s social value orientation, and it can be categorized as
follows: greater than 57.15˚ altruistic, between 22.45˚ and 57.15˚
prosocial, between−12.04˚ and 22.45˚ individualist, and less than
−12.04˚competitive. A German version of the measure was used.
The answers of all except for one participant were transitive.
Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) Scale (Aron et al., 1992) consists
of Venn-like diagrams representing different degrees of overlap of
two circles and measures the degree of interpersonal closeness. In
addition to the seven used by Aron et al. (1992), we included a
diagram where the two circles are clearly separate. The partici-
pants were asked to select the diagram that best described their
relationship to (a) other people in general, (b) people they know,
but are not friends with, (c) their closest friend, (d) their spouse,
and (e) their closest blood relative. In contrast to the circles Aron
et al. (1992) introduced, in our study the circles did not vary in
size across response alternatives. This was done to keep the notion
of the “size of the self” constant. Also, in the preliminary testing
of the questionnaire, people noted the change of the circle sizes
and wondered about its meaning. The scale was constructed by a
native German speaker and checked by another. The items were
used separately in the analysis.
A set of logical dilemmas were used as a manipulation check.
The logical dilemmas consisted of the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT; Frederick, 2005), a new question (“How much does a brick
weigh if it weighs 1 kg and a half a brick?”) and a set of four
syllogisms (e.g., Zielinski et al., 2010). In the four categorical syl-
logisms, the participant was to choose whether the deduction was
true or false; the first and the last of them were true. The second
and the fourth were adaptations from a study by Zielinski et al.
(2010) who reported the percentage of correct answers as 0.20 and
0.53 respectively. The measures were constructed or translated by
a native German speaker and checked by another. The syllogisms
were as follows:
• All square blocks are green blocks. Some big blocks are square
blocks.⇒ Some big blocks are green blocks.
• Some tables are not wooden tables. No wooden table is yellow.
⇒ Some tables are not yellow.
• All square blocks are green blocks. Some big blocks are not
square blocks.⇒ Some big blocks are not green blocks.
• Some round tables are wooden. No wooden table is big.⇒ Some
round tables are not big.
Delay of gratification was measured with four questions, also used
by Frederick (2005). The questions were as follows:
• Would you prefer to get 3400 Euros this month or 3800 Euros
next month?
• Would you prefer to get 100 Euros now or 140 Euros next year?
• How much would you be willing to pay for an overnight
shipping of a chosen book?
Participants were presented three dilemmas where they had to
decide how morally acceptable it would be to kill one person to
save a number of other people. In the first dilemma, the partici-
pant was asked to rate on a six-point Likert-scale how permissible
it is for a submarine captain to shoot a bleeding crew member in
order to save oxygen, and thus save the rest of the crew (for the
full text, see Paxton et al., 2012). The two remaining dilemmas
are two versions of the Railroad dilemma. In the first version, the
participant rates how permissible it is to flip a switch to redirect a
train to another track killing only one man instead of five and in
the second, to push a pedestrian to the railroad tracks and make
the train stop again killing only one man instead of five (see, e.g.,
Greene et al., 2001). The dilemmas were translated by a native Ger-
man speaker and checked by another. The dilemmas were analyzed
separately. Previous research has found that the manipulation of
one’s thinking mode affects the judgments they make on moral
dilemmas (Paxton et al., 2012).
PROCEDURE
The experiment followed a 2-factorial design (between groups).
Upon entering the experiment room the participants were ran-
domly assigned into one of two groups: System 1 group was
instructed to decide according to their first impulse, their gut-
feeling and intuition and System 2 group was instructed to delib-
erate and take their time before deciding. The maximum pay-off
the participants could obtain was 80 Euros (paid in cash). Two
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female assistants who were not aware of the hypotheses collected
the data. The duration of the entire experiment was less than 1 h.
At the beginning of the experiment, before manipulations, the
participants were asked to fill out electronic versions of the REI-10,
a questionnaire of everyday altruism based on the altruism ques-
tionnaire by Rushton et al. (1981), and the Measure of Emotional
Empathy and paper versions of the SVO and the IOS.
After filling out the questionnaires, half of the participants were
assigned into System 1, intuitive condition, and the other half into
System 2, rational condition. The System 1 condition obtained the
following instruction: “Relax and make your decisions as quickly
as possible. Trust your intuition and answer by your gut-feeling.
Give the first choice that comes to your mind.” The System 2 con-
dition got the following instruction: “Take your time and think
your choices through before you make your decision. Do not to let
emotions get in the way. Deliberate on your answer before giving
it.” The instructions were repeated before each of the following
phases of the experiment.
Participants were given 20 Euros in cash (coins and notes) and
asked to split the money with an unknown participant in a follow-
ing experiment (DG). They were told that they can give anything
between all of the money to nothing at all and that the choice is
completely theirs to make. The variable DG derived from the DG
was the amount of money the participant kept to herself. After
this one-shot DG, the participant was given 2 Euros in cash and
was again asked to split the money. This time she was explained
that the other person has the opportunity reject the offer, in which
case neither of them will receive anything. The participant was
told that using a list of minimum offers that previous participants
found to be just acceptable, the experimenter would randomly
assign her offer to one of those participants, and accept or reject it
accordingly. This was meant to increase the credibility of the game
and to suggest that the decision the participant makes will have
real consequences. In reality, all offers that were greater than zero
were accepted (no offers of zero were made). Before making their
decision, the participant was asked to repeat the instruction to the
experimenter in order to ensure full understanding of the game.
The UG was then repeated with 18 Euros. The variables derived
from these UG were the amounts of money the participants
received from the 2 Euro split UG1 and from the 18 Euro split UG2.
After the two trials of the UG in the role of the proposer, the par-
ticipant played 20 trials in the role of the responder with different
proposers on a computer. The participant was presented with a
short explanation of an UG with an example. She was told that
the offers had been made by previous participants and that her
decisions will have true consequences in following experiments.
In reality, the offers were predetermined, and the same for each
participant, though presented in randomized order. She was also
told that her responses in the UG would be saved in a database
and used later on as the responses to future participants’ propos-
als. The participant was also told that the pay she would receive
is the sum of all accepted offers. The design of the game is pre-
sented in Figure 1 and the Euro amounts of the offers in Table 1.
The variable derived from the computerized UG was the sum their
winnings UG3.
After 20 trials of single-shot UGs, the participant was given the
money she earned and was asked to fill out a series of question-
naires. First, she was asked to rate on a eight-point scale from“Very
unfair” to “Very fair” the fairness of five different offers in the UG,
namely 0.13 (11%), 1 (15%), 1.3 (40%), 2.16 (11%), and 0.1 Euros
(20%). This was followed by the logical dilemmas. Lastly, the par-
ticipant was to rate the acceptability of actions in the three moral
dilemmas.
After the dilemmas, the participant was thanked and made
believe the experiment had ended. However, just before leav-
ing the lab, she was told that we had agreed to some colleagues
from another faculty to spread information of a campaign for
which they are searching for participants. She was given a flyer
and told that this was about volunteering as a discussion group
leader in a project aimed at teaching tolerance toward foreigners
to young delinquents found guilty of racist crimes. The informa-
tion given was meant to make volunteering intimidating; facing
the young criminals in such a situation and trying to make them
more tolerant would require moral courage (Kayser et al., 2010).
Directly after the participant had made her decision, she was
thoroughly debriefed and asked to rate (five-point Likert-scale)
how threatening and uncomfortable leading the discussion group
would have been.
After the debriefing, on the way out of the laboratory, the partic-
ipant was incidentally made aware of an actual collection currently
running in the department and she was pointed to a charity poster
advert from Greenpeace and a charity collection box, where she
could make a voluntary donation if she liked to contribute. Green-
peace’s work against oil industry was selected for its visibility in the
media and provoking advertisement showing a burning oil plat-
form. This measure represents an incidental and thus ecologically
FIGURE 1 |The design of the computerized ultimatum game.
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Table 1 | Euro amounts offered by proposers in the computer
ultimatum game.
11% 15% 20% 40%
0.13 0.76 0.40 1.30
2.16 7.33 13.00 1.00
0.50 1.00 0.10 0.25
3.50 0.50 1.50 2.50
0.25 1.50 2.00 0.30
The proposer’s splits are 100− x%. For example, the first split is 0.13 Euro for the
participant and 1.05 Euros for the proposer.
valid measure insofar as it is hopefully not recognized as part of the
experimental procedure by the participant. After the participant
left, the collection box was checked and the amount of the dona-
tion taken as a measure. The participant was then sent a debriefing
e-mail disclosing the purpose of the donation, ensuring that all of
the money donated would be given to Greenpeace, and including
an overview of the goals of the experiment.
RESULTS
The distributions of most of the dependent variables differed
significantly from normal, and hence mainly non-parametric
methods were used: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient for
correlation and Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) for group
comparisons. From the independent measures, the Need for Cog-
nition, the Empathy scale, and the SVO agreed with a normal
distribution, NFC: Shapiro–WilkW (38)= 0.97, p= 0.348; Empa-
thy: W (38)= 0.97, p= 0.382; SVO: W (38)= 0.96, p= 0.198. For
these three scales,parametric analyses (Pearson’s product-moment
correlation and Student’s t -test for group comparisons) were
used when appropriate. As the estimates of effect size, we use
Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1969) for the parametric and r for the non-
parametric comparisons (Cohen, 1969; Fritz et al., 2012) in order
to present the most commonly known and studied indicators.
Even though these measures are not directly comparable, they are,
to our knowledge, the most widely applied, and thus offer the best
comparability, in their respective areas of application.
MANIPULATION CHECK
To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, the sum of the
response times in the UG on the computer were calculated and
compared between the conditions. The mean time in the System 1
condition was 615.92 s (SD= 208.84 s, Mdn= 577.71 s) and in the
System 2 condition 2700.45 s (SD= 4220.45, Mdn= 1539.02 s).
The difference between the conditions was significant, MWW
U = 39.00, p< 0.001, and the effect size was large, r = 0.74,
following Cohen’s (1969) operational definitions of effect sizes.
The second manipulation check was the CRT and the brick
question. Due to the similar nature of the two tasks, a compos-
ite variable CRTB was formed. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability
of the CRTB was 0.69. The System 2 group scored higher on
CRTB,M = 2.33, SD= 0.30, Mdn= 2.50, than the System 1 group,
M = 1.21, SD= 0.23, Mdn= 1.00. The difference was statistically
significant and the effect size was medium, MWW U = 162.00,
p= 0.008, r = 0.38.
The two conditions did not differ in the number of correct
answers in the four syllogisms, System 1 and System 2: Mdn= 2.00;
MWWU = 242.00,p= 0.276, presumably due to floor effects. The
percentage of better than chance (more than half correct) answers
was only 33: 10 participants got more than half correct in the
System 1 condition and six participants in the System 2 condition.
STATE PROCESSING MODE
To study the effect of situational thinking mode on differ-
ent types of prosocial behavior, the differences on these mea-
sures between the two manipulation conditions were investi-
gated. The mean amount of money kept in the DG was 13.65
Euros (SD= 3.53 Euros; Mdn= 14.00 Euros), in the first UG
(UG1) 1.08 Euros (SD= 0.18 Euro, Mdn= 1.00 Euros), and in the
second UG (UG2) 10.44 Euros (SD= 3.53 Euros, Mdn= 10.00
Euros). These results agree with previous research (Güth et al.,
1982; Thaler, 1988; Strobel et al., 2011). The mean total won
in the computerized UG (UG3) was 56.63 Euros (SD= 11.36
Euros, Mdn= 34.15 Euros). No significant differences were found
between the two conditions in the decisions on the DG or the UG,
DG: MWW U = 214.50, p= 0.119; UG1: U = 222.50, p= 0.112;
UG2: U = 224.00, p= 0.175; UG3: U = 279.00, p= 0.852. The
medians of these four games respectively were 12.50, 1.00, 10.00,
and 33.37 Euros for the System 1 group and 15.00, 1.00, 11.00,
and 34.27 Euros for the System 2 group. Also, the difference of
total amount of winnings between the two conditions was not
significant, U = 241.50, p= 0.338.
The difference between the System 1 and System 2 condi-
tions in volunteering as a group leader was not significant, MWW
U = 264.00, p= 0.562. Approximately 46% of the participants in
System 1 condition and 38% of participants in System 2 condi-
tion volunteered in the moral courage task. The overall percentage
of volunteering was 42%. Those who did not volunteer rated the
task significantly more unpleasant than those who volunteered,
t (46)= 3.25,p= 0.002, there was no difference in how threatening
they rated the task. The effect size of the rating of unpleasantness
was large, Cohen’s d = 0.97.
The mean amount of money donated by the System 1 group
was 0.89 Euro (SD= 2.23 Euro) and by the System 2 group 1.13
Euro (SD= 1.51 Euro). The difference between the groups was
not significant, MWW U = 280.00, p= 0.856. The total amount
of donations was 48.42 Euro,which was approximately mere 1.78%
of the total amount of winnings. There was no significant differ-
ence in the donation rate between the manipulation groups; nearly
45% of the participants made a donation. The largest donation was
9.83 Euros.
TRAIT PROCESSING MODE
To investigate the influence of the generally preferred thinking
style on the measures of altruistic punishment and helping behav-
ior, the two subscales of the REI were correlated with the winnings
in the DG and UG monetary games and the amount of donation.
In addition, correlations of the NFC and the FI with other ques-
tionnaire measures and interrelations of the dependent variables
were established in order to explore the possible mechanisms by
which the generally preferred thinking style could influence social
cooperation. The results are presented in Table 2. Importantly,
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Table 2 | Non-parametric correlations of need for cognition and FI with the dependent variables of social cooperation and with the other
questionnaire measures, and their intercorrelations.
Measure NFC FI 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 DG −0.08 −0.42** 0.30* 0.64*** 0.27† 0.01 −0.19 −0.34* −0.13 −0.71***
2 UG3 −0.10 −0.35* 0.88*** 0.50*** −0.08 −0.09 0.15 0.17 −0.18
3 Total of games −0.16 −0.46** 0.47** −0.02 −0.19 −0.11 0.03 −0.45**
4 MC 0.31* −0.23 −0.15 −0.10 0.04 0.26† −0.01
5 Impulsiveness −0.28† 0.37* 0.10 −0.01 −0.03 0.03
6 Empathy 0.06 0.45** 0.34* 0.51** 0.22
7 IOS people known 0.07 0.33* 0.45** 0.28
†
8 IOS relative 0.19 0.34* 0.32*
9 SVO 0.22 0.34*
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, †p<0.10. Correlations of the NFC (need for cognition) with the empathy and the SVO (social value orientation) are parametric.
FI, Faith in Intuition, DG, Dictator Game, UG3, computerized Ultimatum Game, MC, Moral Courage task, IOS, Inclusion of Other in Self.
the NFC and the FI did not correlate significantly with each
other, Spearman’s r = 0.15, p= 0.297, consistent with the theo-
retical construction of the scales as two independent dimensions
(Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Results show that the higher the FI, the
less money participants kept for themselves in the DG, suggest-
ing higher tendency for sharing behavior, and the less money they
accepted as respondents in the computerized UG as the respon-
der, suggesting higher tendency for altruistic punishment. When
all the winnings were combined, the higher FI the participant had,
the lower his total amount of winnings was.
Need for cognition had no significant correlation with the
money kept in the DG, the amount of winnings in the computer-
ized ultimatum game, or the combined winnings in the monetary
games.
Generally preferred thinking style had an influence on the
decision to volunteer as a discussion group leader: those who
volunteered in the moral courage task had a higher need for cog-
nition than those who did not volunteer, Volunteers: M = 18.05,
SD= 2.87; Non-volunteers: M = 16.00, SD= 3.45, the difference
was statistically significant, t (45)= 2.17, p= 0.035, and the effect
size was medium, d = 0.65. A similar trend was found with FI,
so that people who volunteered in the moral courage task scored
lower in the FI compared to those who did not volunteer, MWW
U = 205.50, p= 0.116, the effect size was small, r = 0.22.
Information about the mechanisms behind the relationship
between FI and altruistic behaviors can be taken from the intercor-
relations with other questionnaires. The higher the FI, the higher
the person scored on impulsiveness, empathy, social value orienta-
tion, inclusion of others to self in the context of people they know
and inclusion of blood relatives to self. Social value orientation
correlated significantly negatively with the money kept in the DG,
so that the more altruistic participants were in their orientation,
the more money they gave in the DG to the anonymous other.
The negative relationship between the SVO and the amount of
money kept in the DG was significantly stronger than that of FI
and money kept in the DG, z = 2.08, p= 0.019. The effect size
of the difference between the correlations was computed as sug-
gested by Siegel and Castellan (1988). The effect size was medium,
q= 0.44. Interestingly, the SVO did not correlate with the other
monetary games, moral courage, or donation to charity.
Need for cognition did not have many significant connections
with the prosocial personality measures. There was a trend that the
higher a person scored on the impulsiveness scale, the lower they
rated their need for cognition, Spearman’s r =−0.28, p= 0.064.
The difference between the correlations of the NFC and the FI with
impulsiveness was statistically significant, z =−3.21, p< 0.001,
and the effect size was large, q= 0.68. Neither the NFC nor the FI
correlated significantly with the amount of money the participant
kept in the UG as the proposer or the amount of money donated
to charity. No other significant correlations for the NFC or the FI
were found.
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
No significant correlations were found between the sum variable
of self-reported everyday altruism and the behavioral measures of
altruism (all p> 0.44). In order to investigate this further, a cor-
relation between the item “I donate to charity” and the amount of
donation made in the experiment was formed. There was a trend
that the higher participants rated this item, the more they gave to
charity in the experiment, Spearman’s r = 0.26, p= 0.075. How-
ever, the correlation between the everyday altruism score and the
SVO was nearly non-existent.
DISCUSSION
We have studied the relationship between rational cognitive and
emotional-intuitive thinking modes in the context of prosocial
behavior. We have focused separately on state and trait processing
styles and on three different types of altruistic behaviors, namely
sharing and helping behavior, altruistic punishment, and moral
courage. The main result is that the generally preferred thinking
style of FI was linked with altruistic punishment and some form of
sharing behavior while that of need for cognition was associated
with moral courage.
The situational or state thinking style was manipulated by
experimental instructions to either decide by intuition or to delib-
erate and take time before deciding, an effective method derived
from literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Horstmann
et al., 2009). The manipulation did seem to work, as evidenced
by both the manipulation check task and by response times in the
computerized UG. Nonetheless, no significant differences between
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the two groups were found in sharing/help giving, altruistic pun-
ishment, moral courage. The effects on the economic games were
too small to become significant, and thus failed to replicate the
results of a study by Rand et al. (2012) who found that those
who have been prompted to answer quickly and intuitively behave
more cooperatively in economic games than those who have been
instructed to deliberate on their decisions. One reason could be
the relatively small sample size which may have kept the signif-
icance of the differences too low. Another reason could be that
in this study, the amount of money the participants could receive
was uncommonly high. The maximum amount of 80 Euros is
a substantial sum, especially for students, and it was designed
to make the decisions feel real and have true consequences, real
impact. However, this may have primed the participants to focus
on the money and to leave other facets of the experiment for lesser
attention.
However, in addition to manipulating state processing, we
investigated the impact of thinking style trait. Here we found a
number of significant relationships with FI. Firstly, FI was inversely
connected with the amount of money participants received from
the monetary games. More accurately, the higher their level of FI,
the more money they gave away in the DG (higher sharing behav-
ior), and the less they accepted unfair offers in the computerized
UG (altruistic punishment). As individuals with higher FI tend
to rely more on their affective states, they appear to decide more
prosocially in monetary games compared to individuals low in
FI. This is in line with the results of Rand et al. (2012) that sug-
gest a special role of intuition in promoting cooperation, although
they focused on the situational processing mode. Part of this con-
nection may be mediated by stronger social bonding and higher
emotional care for the wellbeing of other individuals. At the same
time, these individuals describe themselves as more impulsive,
which might render them more likely to react with feelings of
anger when confronted with an unfair offer in the UG, hence they
show more altruistic punishment (c.f. Fehr and Gächter, 2002;
Singer and Steinbeis, 2009).
By contrast, those low on FI may not respond so emotionally
per se, or they tend to override their emotive impulses when mak-
ing monetary decisions. As a result, they punish less when given
an unfair offer and share less in the DG, thereby making more
money. It thus seems that sharing behavior and altruistic punish-
ment could be two forms of altruism that depend on trait-related
intuitive processing.
Contrary to FI, need for cognition was positively associated
with volunteering as a discussion group leader in a situation that
required moral courage. The higher individuals scored in need for
cognition, the more likely they were to find the courage to con-
front that potentially dangerous situation. Together with the above
results, this could represent an empirical dissociation between type
of prosocial behavior and trait-related thinking mode. FI seems
relevant for helping/sharing behavior and altruistic punishment,
but not so much for moral courage, while the opposite may be true
for need for cognition. The question is: what motivational basis
drives this dissociation?
The crucial difference may be that situations affording moral
courage enact feelings of anxiety, and with it a behavioral motiva-
tion to withdraw, alongside prosocial feelings (compassion) and
anger, two approach-related emotions. Therefore, a behavioral
conflict can result especially in prosocial individuals who tend to
react more emotionally: on the one hand, they feel like withdraw-
ing from the intimidating situation (e.g., Sekerka and Bagozzi,
2007), on the other hand, their anger fuels them into taking action
(e.g., anger, Kayser et al., 2010). The net result of this fight-or-flight
conflict may result in very little, while individuals with relatively
high need for cognition may either experience much less of this
conflict or find sufficient self-discipline or self-regulation in order
to override such impulses, and act in line with their reasoning and
moral standards.
This view would refine previous suggestions by Kayser et al.
(2010) who argue that the specific emotion of anger leads to moral
courage. Indeed, anger directed toward the offender should sup-
port the moral position and encourage to stand up for one’s beliefs.
However, we argue, this process may manifest in behavior only
when the opposing anxiety-driven motivation to withdraw (and
to avoid conflict with other people) is relatively low or can be con-
trolled, hence we observed it only in individuals who score high in
need for cognition. On the other hand, we need to bear in mind
that the present experiment contained many different measures
of prosocial behavior and it could be that the order of the tasks
has influenced the willingness to volunteer as a group leader; par-
ticipants scoring high in FI may have felt they have already given
enough in the previous tasks while participants scoring high in
need for cognition may have taken this task as their opportunity
to contribute after gaining in the previous tasks. We therefore cau-
tion against over interpretation of this particular finding without
prior replication.
Help giving in the form of donating to a charity was not con-
nected to any of the generally preferred thinking styles. A low
percentage of the participants donated money to charity, and the
amounts donated were on average less than 2% of the amount
they had won from the monetary games. Notably, this measure
was different from the other decisions as the donation was made
alone outside the experiment room without any sense of being
observed. The participants were left alone in an anteroom of the
laboratory, and the money they donated was counted and they
were debriefed about it only after they had left. At face value, this
measure was the closest one to behavior in everyday life, since
there was no one observing and the situation was as natural as it
could be. Although it is not possible to interpret null results, we
wonder why these null results were obtained in the measure that
we would have considered perhaps the most ecologically valid one
of the entire experiment.
Participants completed many questionnaires measuring proso-
cial behavior and it could be argued that these questionnaires may
have pressured the participants to act according to their answers
in the following situations (the games, volunteering, and dona-
tion). However, unexpectedly, none of the behavioral measures of
social cooperation correlated with the reported altruistic behavior
in everyday life. This could mean that people overestimate the fre-
quency of altruistic deeds in their life compared to their behavior
in laboratory setting, or otherwise provide biased reports of those
behaviors. Another explanation could be that our experimental
measures taken, although commonly used in laboratory studies
on prosocial behavior, are no valid indices of behavior outside the
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laboratory. We cannot say which of these two explanations holds
true, but we do think this important question of ecological validity
needs to be focused more in the growing research field on prosocial
behavior. At least, no clear demand created by the questionnaires
to act in certain way during the behavioral measures was observed.
It is also noteworthy that several German versions of the measures
have not been validated.
Taken together, we found that subjectively preferred, trait-
like, thinking style may affect the decision to share when under
observation, to altruistically punish, and to volunteer in a situation
that requires moral courage. FI promoted the first two behav-
iors and need for cognition the third. Our findings are the
first to suggest a dissociation of the cognitive-emotional under-
pinnings of different types of altruism, and may be helpful
for designing interventions and campaigns aimed at engaging
people into altruistic, prosocial, and cooperative behavior in
a world with an ever-growing population whose resources are
limited.
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